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Abstract 
The assessment of infrastructure investments is often affected by inaccuracy in traffic forecasting, optimism bias and overvaluation 
of expected benefits. In general, even when such misrepresentation is not strategically introduced by proponents to push their 
projects, valuators and decision makers must cope with the existence of a risk of demand levels below expectations and consequent 
problem of overinvestment. 
In this sense, the concept of option value suggests that flexible or reversible projects may have a higher economic net present value 
compared with rigid schemes characterised by sunk costs. However, conventionally used cost benefit analysis (CBA) is very seldom 
used to manage such problem due to the complexity of the issue (for example when introducing a complete risk analysis). Moreover, 
such CBAs are still conceived as a static tool to decide ex-ante about an investment. 
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework and a practical application of CBA to formally manage such uncertainty and help 
the decision makers by postponing some decisions to the following running phase. The idea is to assess the project as split into 
smaller functional sections and bind the construction of a further section to the compliance of a pre-determined “switching rule”. In 
practical terms, we adapt a normal CBA procedure to manage also the time dimension of time of investments to reallocate risks 
already in the early design stage of transport infrastructures. 
The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, we introduce a way to extend conventional CBA methodology to manage the phasing of 
projects. Secondly, we demonstrate both theoretically (with a simplified model) and practically (with a more complex case study) the 
positive effect of phasing under certain conditions (limitedness of sunk-costs due to phasing, predominance of capacity problems). 
By numerically developing the CBA of the Turin – Lyon high speed rail project, we show how to reduce the risk of overestimation of 
traffic and its positive effect in terms of NPV of the project: if forecasts are optimistic, only the most effective parts of the scheme 
will be built. If the traffic forecasts are correct, the new infrastructure will be built as a whole in steps and will generate the highest 
net benefits. 
Keywords: cost benefit analysis, option value, optimism bias, strategic misrepresentation, benefit shortfall, planning fallacy, 
forecasting  
1. Introduction 
The assessment of infrastructure investments is often affected by inaccuracy in traffic forecasting, optimism 
bias and overvaluation of expected benefits. In general, even when such misrepresentation is not strategically 
introduced by proponents to push their projects, valuators and decision makers must cope with the existence 
of a risk of demand levels below expectations and consequent problem of overinvestment. 
In their broad work in the field, Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) analyse in deep the issue of inaccuracy in traffic 
forecasting in megaprojects, together with the specular issue of cost overruns. They found that in large-scale 
rail projects actual traffic is on average 51.4% lower than expected (with a standard deviation of 28.1), while 
large-scale road projects experience an actual traffic 9.5% higher than expected (with a standard deviation of 
44.3). In analysing the possible causes of such inaccuracies, Flyvbjerg (2008) rejects conventional technical 
explanations of bad forecasting techniques, as these would result in normally or near-normally distributed 
errors with an average near zero. Instead he suggests that psychological (optimism bias) and political-
economic explanations (strategic misrepresentation) better account for inaccurate forecasts. An approach to 
bypass both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation is proposed: starting from the work of the 
Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who won the Nobel prize in economics in 2002, Flyvbjerg 
proposes to develop Reference Class Forecasting. A reference class forecast of a given planned project is 
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based on knowledge about actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects already carried 
out. By the identification of a (broad enough and statistically significant) reference class of past projects, this 
places the project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from the class of reference projects. This 
methodology is thus very simple, but – as the author states – “the real challenge in doing a reference class 
forecast lies in assembling a valid dataset that will allow a reliable forecast. Such datasets are rare in real-
life policy-making and planning.” 
The high uncertainty in transport forecasting is strongly linked with the concept of option value, analysed in 
deep by Dixit & Pindyck in 1994. They suggest that flexible or reversible projects may have a higher 
economic net present value compared with rigid schemes characterised by sunk costs, because there is a 
value in waiting to invest when it allows to adopt a better decision on the basis of more information. 
Chu & Polzin (2000) gave an important contribution in the field of timing rules for investments, starting 
from the transport literature on investment timing (e.g. Szymanski, 1991 and Chu & Polzin, 1998) and from 
the economic literature on the timing of irreversible investments under uncertainty (e.g. McDonald & Siegel, 
1986 and Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). In their work they provide a set of analytical rules for timing major 
transport investments; they demonstrate that, even in conditions of (relative) certainty on traffic forecasting, 
the “build now” solution may not be the one that provides the higher net present value. 
It is thus apparent that the problem of uncertainty, and the consequent possible value of waiting to invest, has 
been already deepen in the transport and economic literatures. However, cost benefit analysis (CBA) is very 
seldom used to manage such problem due to the complexity of the issue (for example, when introducing a 
complete risk analysis) and the large amount of required data. Moreover, such CBAs are usually still 
conceived as a static tool to decide ex-ante about an investment. 
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework and a practical application of CBA to formally manage 
such uncertainty and to help decision makers to calculate when postponing some decisions to the following 
running phase gives better value. The idea is to assess the project as split into smaller functional sections and 
bind the construction of a further section to the compliance of a pre-determined “switching rule”. This rule, 
somehow innovative in theory, has been already applied in practice in a few cases. For example in the case 
of the Swiss Lötschberg base tunnel, opened in 2007, the second construction phase can start only when 
demand had reached a pre-defined level. As traffic in the first two years of operation has grown in line with 
the forecasting (113 trains/day versus 114, Schreyer, Sutter & Maibach, 20091), the doubling of the tunnel 
has been planned. 
In practical terms, we adapt a normal CBA procedure to manage also the time dimension of time of 
investments to practically reallocate risks already in the early design stage of transport infrastructures. 
The paper is organised as follows. Firstly we will study a theoretical model in order to better understand the 
issue. Secondly, we will present the CBA of a possible “switching rule” strategy applied to the planned New 
Turin-Lyon Railway, a new mixed use high speed rail between Italy and France. In the end, we will derive 
possible reflections. 
2. A theoretical case study 
To better focus the issue, we make some considerations on a simplified theoretical case of new 
infrastructure. We look at a case of parallel phasing - easier to model – then we will make some 
consideration on serial phasing in the following sections. 
Let’s consider an infrastructure, say a tunnel, quickly connecting “A” with “B”. Firstly, we simply assess a 
single tube version and a twin tube version of the tunnel, which provides higher capacity. 
                                                     
1
 Nevertheless, this effect have been achieved by compensating a minor dynamic in freight traffic (64 trains/day versus 
72), partly generated by the economic crisis, with an higher increase of passenger traffic (49 versus 42). 
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 Costs 
Let I be the investment cost of the single tube of the tunnel and θ  the construction time.  
For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that: 
- the cost is uniformly spread through the construction period; 
- operating and management costs are constant over time and equal to a k fraction of the I investment 
cost; 
- construction starts in year 0. 
The twin tube version of the same tunnel costs Is ⋅⋅2 , s ≤ 1 being the possible savings due to the 
simultaneous construction of both the tubes. 
 Expected traffic and capacity issues 
Let q0 be the expected traffic in the θ first year of operation, growing at an α annual growth rate possibly up 
to the saturation of the qMAX capacity of the single tube infrastructure.  We also make the hypothesis that the 
traffic will not exceed the twin tube tunnel capacity within the analysis horizon. The saturation year ts for the 
single tube version can be determined by imposing MAXs qtq =)( . We than have [ ] MAXt qeq s =⋅ −⋅ θα0  and 
thus [ ]
0q
q
e MAX
ts
=
−⋅ θα
. If we call f the first year traffic/capacity ratio 
MAXq
qf 0=  of the single tube tunnel, we 
obtain [ ] fe
st 1
=
−⋅ θα
. The saturation year is thus simply defined by the relation 
( )
α
θ fts ln−= .  
 
 Benefits and social balance 
Let’s assume the benefits to be proportional to traffic: )()( tqbtB ⋅= . The twin tube version of the tunnel 
will just provide higher capacity with the same performances, so the yearly unit benefits b will be the same 
in the two cases2. 
We assume the social costs of saturation to be so high that we want to avoid them in any case by expanding 
anyway the tunnel as soon as it is needed. 
If we call 1NPV and 2NPV  the net present values of respectively the single tube alternative and twin tubes 
alternative, we obtain the quite trivial consideration that 12 NPVNPV >  if simply Tts ≤ , i.e. twin tube 
tunnel is a better alternative if saturation is expected within the analysis horizon.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that building both the tubes now is the best choice. 
 Building of one section after the other and introduction of a “switching rule” 
Let’s now introduce a different scenario. As said, the idea is to split the project into smaller functional 
sections and bind the construction of a further section to the compliance of a pre-determined rule. In practice: 
- We build now the first tube of the tunnel, thus having an I investment cost. 
                                                     
2
 This also allows us not to distinguish existing traffic (diverted from other routes) from generated traffic, which usually 
enjoys lower benefits. Thus the b unit benefit should be intended as an average benefit for all the users, both existing 
and diverted. No rule of half is thus needed. 
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- After opening the new infrastructure to operation, we check the actual q0 traffic in the tunnel in the 
first year and it’s α growth rate in the first years. 
- We decide if and whether to build the second tube on the basis of the actual traffic volume and 
growth. In this case we pay the second tube I instead of 
2
2sI
. 
We will call this procedure “switching rule”. In this case the rule is the reaching of the maximum capacity of 
the first section: we start to build the second section of the infrastructure in year ts-θ, i.e. θ years before the 
first section gets saturated according to actually observed traffic and growth rate in the first years of 
operation. 
In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we represent traffic and capacity, with respect to time in the “build together now” 
scenario and in the “build separate upon switching rule” scenario. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Traffic and capacity in the “build together now” scenario. 
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Figure 2 – Traffic and capacity in the “build separate upon switching rule” scenario. 
 
In absolute terms, building separately the two sections will cost I⋅2  which is higher than the Is ⋅⋅2  cost of 
building them together; however, shifting the second part of the investment forward in time will reduce its 
actualised value because of the discount rate. We thus want to know for which s value it is better to build the 
two tubes together now instead of waiting, on the basis of the “switching rule”. 
We define [ ] dtetCtBNPV
T
rt
∫
−
⋅−=
0
)()( , being T the analysis horizon3 and r the social discount rate. We 
then write the NPVs of the “build together now” scenario and of the “build separate upon switching rule” 
scenario. We are obviously considering the case of Tts ≤ (otherwise the single tube is the best solution from 
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 No residual value is considered, however this does not affect the results as it would be the same for both scenarios. 
“Contemporary Issues in CBA in the Transport Sector”, Workshop on March 16, 2011. Centre for Transport Studies (KTH), Stockholm (Sweden). 
  6 
In order to know which s simultaneous construction savings value would make the “build together now” 
alternative preferable, we impose 
srNPVsNPV 22 )( ≥ , and we obtain: 
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A simpler form can be obtained if ∞→T  (and 0>r , which is obvious); the term 0→−Tre , resulting: 
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To better understand the result, in Table 1 we make some examples with indicative fictional values. 
Parameter Description Case 1 
Case 2 
Lower 1
st
 year 
traffic 
Case 3 
Less benefits 
Case 4 
Lower growth 
rate 
I Investment costs, single carriageway 100 100 100 100 
T 
Analysis horizon,  
(starting from year 0) 
45 45 45 45 
r Discount rate 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
θ Construction time, single carriageway 5 5 5 5 
k 
Yearly O&M costs, as a fraction of the I investment 
costs 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0,01 
q0 First year of operation expected traffic 10 5 10 10 
qMAX Capacity of the single carriageway 15 15 15 15 
α Expected traffic growth rate 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
b Unit benefits 1 1 0.5 1 
f = q0 / qMAX First year flow/capacity ratio 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 
ts = θ-
ln(f)/α 
Saturation year, single carriageway 18.52 41.62 18.52 25.27 
NPV2(s) Build together alternative NPV 
304.3 - 
228.8*s 
152.2 - 228.8*s 
152.2 - 
228.8*s 
252.5 - 228.8*s 
NPV2sr Switching rule alternative NPV 123.7 11.57 -28.42 87.1 
s 
Maximum cost for build together to be better,  
as a fraction of build separate cost 
0.79 0.61 0.79 0.72 
Table 1 – Fictional examples of maximum build together costs for the “build together now” alternative to 
perform better than the “build separate upon switching rule” alternative. Underlined values change among the 
cases. 
The s parameter in the last line says that with the given numbers, phasing is better unless a joint construction 
allows savings of more than 20 to 40%. In general, even when a negative NPV is expected, a “switching 
rule” strategy can better perform if sunk-costs due to phasing are limited. As we will see, this seem to be the 
case of the New Turin-Lyon Railway analysed in the following section. 
 Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis 
We have seen that planning infrastructures as split into smaller functional sections on the basis of a 
“switching rule” can provide net benefits, due to discount rate, if the construction costs don’t rise too much 
due to phasing. However, this is probably not the most important advantage of a “switching rule” strategy. 
Transport literature suggests traffic forecasts to be often overestimated for many different reasons: sensitivity 
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analyses play thus a central role in transport project appraisal and the performance of the “build separate 
upon switching rule” scenario increase considerably if we perform a sensitivity analysis on traffic forecasts.  
Let us consider the Case 1 in Table 1. We fix 8.0=s (i.e. building both tubes together costs 80% than 
building the tubes separately, in absolute terms) and we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the q0 
first year traffic and another one with respect to its α growth rate. We obtain the NPV curves, for the build-
together alternative and for the switching-rule alternative, represented in Figure 3and in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3 – Variation of NPV net present value of the “build together now” and “build separate upon switching 
rule” scenarios with respect to the α traffic growth rate. 
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Figure 4 – Variation of NPV net present value of the “build together now” and “build separate upon switching 
rule” scenarios with respect to the q0 traffic in first year of operation. 
It is quite easy to understand that if actual traffic is lower than expected, a “build separate upon switching 
rule” strategy performs better, because it allows to shift the decision of building the second section of the 
infrastructure when it is really needed, allowing to save costs in actualised terms. If traffic forecasts were 
particularly bad, for example because of major external factors like global changes in the economical 
context, a “switching rule” strategy could lead to completely reconsider the second section, thus allowing 
significant public resources savings. In general, we could apply to the previous analyses a probability curve 
of the variable, like the ones in Flyvbjerg (2003). As all probabilty curves tend not to be normal, but 
overoptimistic, the option value associated to the “switching rule” scenario is higher. 
It is clear that reality is quite more complex than the simple case analysed here. For example, if additional 
capacity is not the main expected benefit and if we are considering serial phasing, there could be incremental 
benefits for each built section and, through elasticity, also incremental generated demand. However, gaining 
information from the demand response in the first phase can still help in better plan the second phase (for 
example, by better calibrating the traffic model). This could be again the case of the New Turin-Lyon 
Railway, analysed in the following section. 
 Summary of theoretical findings 
In this section we built a simple theoretical model to manage three different scenarios and calculate the 
respective NPV: a single tube tunnel (NPV1), a double tube tunnel built jointly (NPV2) and a double tube 
tunnel built in two phases, with the second phase started only according a “switching rule” on demand level 
(NPV2sr). While the comparison between NPV1 and NPV2 is trivial, we analysed when NPV2sr is higher 
than NPV2, i.e. when phasing a project is better than a simultaneous capacity expansion. 
We found two results. Firstly, we derived the conditions under which the “switching rule” performs better 
depending on extra-cost associated to simultaneous construction (s). This happens when the actual value of 
the posponed second phase cost is lower than the extra-cost associated to phasing. The case is even more 
significant when no extra-cost exist (s=1), typically when building sequential sections of an infrastructure 
with different saturation levels (see the case in next section). 
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However, the most important contribution of planning an infrastructure in sequential functional sections on 
the basis of a “switching rule” is related to uncertainty. Phasing, in fact, allows to postpone decisions to a 
time when more information is available, typically after the first part of the the infrastructure has been built 
and traffic can be observed. Thus, the true benefit of phasing upon a “switching rule” is related to the value 
of the option of not building the second tube in case of lower than expected traffic. 
3. The case of the New Turin-Lyon Railway and the “FARE” proposal 
The theoretical approach applied to a very simple example in the previous section helped us to better 
understand the issue: phasing the construction of an infrastructure by splitting it into smaller functional 
sections can improve socio-economical performances by gaining information and reducing overinvestment 
risks, if sunk costs due to phasing aren’t too large. 
In this section we present a more complex case study on the issue with respect to a real planned 
infrastructure: the New Turin-Lyon Railway. 
 Short chronicle 
The New Lyon-Turin railway Line (NLTL in the following), whose project has been developed since 1990, 
is today a part of the TENt network. It is nowadays included into the Priority Axis n. 6 (Lyon-Trieste-
Ljubljana-Budapest-Ukrainian border). 
This megaproject is promoted mainly by the Italian and the French government, with the aim to improve the 
freight capacity with respect to the existing line, dating from 1871 (but recently upgraded). The new line will 
have a total length of nearly 250 km, and will involve the building of a 50 km-long base tunnel, plus three of 
nearly 20 km each. 
Despite governmental support, during the last two decades, the project faced strong opposition by the 
population and the local authorities of the Italian Susa valley. These opponents highlight not only the strong 
environmental impact of the new line, but also its very high costs which don’t seem to be counterbalanced by 
benefits; they argue also about the underutilization of the existing line, whose traffic has even been 
decreasing during last 15 years. 
In late 2005, the first prospecting tests in the valley were blocked by huge demonstrations and struggles. To 
get off this situation, the Italian Government established a Technical Observatory, which included 
representatives of all involved authorities (three Ministries, Regione Piemonte, Torino province and city, 
municipalities and mountain districts)4, as well as of railway agencies. 
Between 2006 and 2009, the Observatory verified all controversial issues, but it succeeded in reaching only 
some partial agreement. This result led anyway to a modification of the project, which has been confirmed as 
a priority by the EU. 
In the meanwhile, the local authorities developed an alternative proposal, based on the application of a 
“switching rule”, named “FARE”5, which has however never been subjected to a public comparative 
assessment – neither economic nor environmental. 
Our goal is now to provide a simplified assessment of such project, focusing mainly on the theoretical 
aspects which has been illustrated in previous paragraphs. We show in this paper the preliminary draft results 
                                                     
4
 Andrea Debernardi was member of this Commission as a technical representative of the “Lower Susa Valley 
Mountain District”. 
5
 “FARE” (that sounds in Italian like “doing”) is the acronym for “Ferrovie Alpine Ragionevoli ed Efficienti” 
(Reasonable and Efficient Alpine Railways). 
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of an independent analysis, with the purpose of showing the benefits of phasing infrastructures upon a 
“switching rule” in a case of high uncertainties on the future demand. 
 The NLTL project 
Following the last Italian project (LTF, 2010), the NLTL will connect Lyon to Turin through the Savoy and 
the Susa valley. The first section will include a new HST line running directly from Lyon to Chambèry, as 
well as a new mixed line connecting the freight by-pass of Lyon agglomeration (Countournement Fret de 
l’Agglomeration Lyonnaise = CFAL) to the Sillon alpin through the Chartreuse tunnel (23 km). The second 
section will reach the French Maurienne valley through the Belledonne tunnel (20 km); while the third one 
will cross the boundary with a 57 km-long base tunnel outgoing near Susa. Finally, the fourth section will 
run through the lower Susa valley, including the Orsiera Tunnel (19 km), till Turin. Sections 2, 3 and 4 will 
have a design speed of 220-250 km/h. A further section, not included in the official project but needed for its 
functionality, is the freight by-pass of the Turin agglomeration. 
LYON
TORINO
Grenoble
Genève
Chambèry
Chartreuse
tunnel
Belledonne
tunnel Base tunnel
Orsiera
tunnel
CFAL
Dullin-l’Epine
tunnel
freight
by-pass
 
Figure 5 - The new Lyon-Turin railway line project 
The investment costs involved by this megaproject are very high: nearly 25 billons Euro, of which more than 
10 for the base tunnel.  
Because of its dimension and complexity, the French side project has been split in five functional sections, 
both serial and parallel, whose construction is spread from 2012 to over 2035. On the contrary, the Italian 
side project holds only one section, which includes both the base and the Orsiera tunnel and has to be 
completed in 2023. 
Our evaluation has been developed following the official guidelines of the European Commission (DG 
REGIO, 2008), integrating missing values with those suggested by the simplified guidelines of the Italian 
Infrastructure Manager (RFI, 2005). Due to the lack of detailed data for the Lyon-Chambèry section, the 
analysis excluded the new HST line Lyon-Chambery; moreover, it included the Turin freight by-pass, which 
in our opinion seems necessary to support traffic growth on the new cross-border railway line. 
The total socio-economical actualised value of investment, maintenance and operating costs for the new line, 
discounted at a rate of 3.5%, is about 16 billion Euros, with an actualised residual value of 1.35 billion Euros 
(on a 2014-2064 analysis horizon). 
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The benefits have been defined on the basis of the freight demand forecasts developed by the Technical 
Observatory (Osservatorio, 2008), which indicate a rail traffic of 31.6 Mt in 2030. These forecasts appear to 
be rather optimistic, if compared with the actual negative trend: between 1997 and 2009, rail freight traffic 
on the corridor decreased from 10 Mt/year to less than 3. In the same period traffic remained constant also on 
the parallel highway, before falling down because of the global crisis6. On the other hand, passenger demand 
at the same horizon has been assumed to be 1.4 million passengers/year for international services, and 7.1 (of 
which 6.2 on the Italian side) for local services. The first figure derives from the official project, while the 
second results from our estimates taking into account the “S-bahn” like service program for Turin 
metropolitan area, which is planned to reach the lower Susa valley. 
Even using the official traffic forecasting, the actualised benefits reach in total nearly 10 billion Euros, with a 
clear preponderance of operating cost savings and environmental effects of freight traffic. On the contrary, 
time savings for international passenger traffic play a minor role7. 
Finally, the Net Present Value of this option is equal to -7 billion Euros. 
 The “FARE” proposal 
This proposal, advanced by the lower Susa valley mountain district in 2008, follows some technical 
evidences about network capacity, resulting from the Observatory’s analysis: on the one hand, the existing 
line appears today to be very far from saturation (its capacity being at least 20 Mt/year); on the other hand, 
any important traffic increase is destined to generate bottlenecks in the railway network of Turin, before than 
in the mountain section. 
Therefore, it is possible to imagine for the building of the new line a specific timing starting from the most 
saturated section, namely the Turin by-pass, and gradually approaching the base tunnel8. Following FARE 
proposal, this timing could involve five stages, including a ‘0’ phase, corresponding to the full utilization of 
the existing line, and four building phases. 
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MILANO
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Orbassano
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Stura
Porta Nuova
Lingotto
GENOVA
AV 
Tor
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 Figure 6 - The four building stages included in FARE proposal 
                                                     
6
 12.6 Mtons passed through the Frejus road tunnel in 1997, 13.1 Mtons in 2007 and 10.2 Mtons in 2009. The quite 
close Monte Bianco road tunnel, which somehow represents an alternative paths for a part of the traffic, even 
experienced a reduction from 12.7 Mton in 1997 to 8.6 Mton in 2007 and 7.6 Mton in 2009 (BAV, 2010). 
7
 In the absence of accurate enough data about the generalised transport costs and origin-destination trip matrices, we 
assessed the benefits for diverted traffic using the rule of half, as theory suggests. 
8
 Our analyses suggest that sections will be saturated progressively, from Turin to the base tunnel. 
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Moreover, the FARE option is characterised by the application of a switching rule: the building of each stage 
must start if and only if the actual traffic trend would have required it. This way, if forecasts are optimistic, 
only the most effective parts of the scheme will be built. If the traffic forecasts are correct, the new 
infrastructure will be built as a whole, in steps, without introducing any capacity constraint but solving them 
as soon as they become reality. 
The CBA of this option has been developed on the same model used to assess the NLTL project: we 
maintain the same construction costs of the NLTL scenario, i.e. no sunk-costs due to phasing have been 
introduced. The FARE strategy also proposed major functional changes that would probably allow major 
cost saving with low benefit reductions, but we didn’t consider those changes in this simplified analysis9. In 
the meanwhile, the proposed switching rule has been applied independently to the French side building 
stages, too. 
Considering the traffic forecasts of the technical Observatory, this option has a total actualised cost of 12.2 
billion Euros, which is only partially counterbalanced by benefits (7.3 billion Euros). Nevertheless, the better 
timing of the building results in an increase of NPV, which is now equal to -5.5 billion Euros. 
New Turin-Lyon Railway 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
NLTL FARE 
 M€ M€ 
Costs   
Investment costs -12,839 -9,699 
Infrastructure O&M costs -2,279 -2,279 
Additional regional service subsides -89 -89 
Indirect taxation losses -890 -185 
Residual Value 1,350 1,084 
Sub-Total -14,747 -11,327 
Railway user benefits   
- operating costs reduction – freight (existing) 667 587 
- time savings - freight (existing) 1,315 958 
- time savings – passengers (existing) 403 365 
- generalised costs reduction – diverted freight 1,983 1,287 
- generalised costs reduction – diverted passengers 914 914 
Sub-Total 5,282 4,111 
Decongestion benefits   
- freight 182 165 
- passengers 533 469 
Sub-Total 715 634 
Social costs reduction   
- freight 2,961 1,539 
- passengers 1,020 1,021 
Sub-Total 3,981 2,560 
   
Marginal Opportunity Cost of Public Funds (MOCPF = 0.15) -2,212 -1,675 
NPV (r = 3.5%) -6,981 -5,540 
Table 2 – Preliminary results of our independent CBA of the New Turin-Lyon Railway. Build together strategy 
(NLTL) versus build separate upon "switching rule" strategy (FARE) with reference to official traffic forecasts 
(Osservatorio, 2008). 
Our analysis suggests that even if official traffic forecasting would actually occur, the FARE strategy would 
provide a better (less negative) socio-economical performance for nearly 1.4 billion Euro. 
                                                     
9
 In particular, our analysis do not take account of the cost savings obtained by the adoption of a lower design speed 
(180-190 km/h), which was proposed in FARE option following the evidence of poor benefits associated to time 
savings for international passenger traffic and no benefits at all for freight. A reduction of design speed could results 
also in a shortening of tunnels. 
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 Sensitivity analysis 
From the theoretical point of view, the most interesting aspect of the FARE proposal is probably its higher 
resilience to traffic change. For this reason, our study included a broad sensitivity analysis referred to 
demand forecasts changes, both on the absolute value of traffic and on the time shifting of the forecast first 
year traffic10.  
The results are synthesised in Figure 7, showing how the NPV of NLTL (red lines) decreases at any lowering 
of forecast demand, as well as at any temporal shifting of the traffic curve. In the extreme case of null traffic, 
the benefits go to zero and the Net Present Value becomes equal to the project’s costs. On the contrary, when 
traffic reduces, the NPV of FARE proposal tends to increase, reflecting the postponement (or even the 
cancellation) of some building stages with their costs. Quite obviously, in the case in which the switching 
rule is adopted on a serial project with a ‘0’ stage, a traffic zeroing causes the annulment not only of benefit, 
but also of costs, and of NPV, too. 
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Figure 7 – Sensitivity analysis of the build together strategy (NLTL) versus build separate upon "switching rule" 
strategy (FARE) with respect to the traffic level in 25th year of operation and to the time shifting of the 
forecasted first year traffic. 
                                                     
10
 Since in 2009 traffic was far well below the reference traffic, first year forecasted traffic level may be reached 
forward in time. 
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Sensitivity analysis thus suggests that the phasing FARE strategy will always provide better socio-
economical performances than the NLTL project up to an actual traffic at the 25th year of 35-36 to nearly 50 
million tons/year according to time-shifting of the forecast. For example, if traffic will be of some 20 
tons/year instead of the forecasted 30 tons/year in 2030, the NPV of FARE is 6-10 billions Euro higher than 
NLTL one. Obviously, since NPV is negative, those better performances have actually to be interpreted as 
less negative. 
4. Final considerations 
The purpose of the paper was twofold. Firstly, we introduced a way to extend conventional CBA 
methodology to manage the phasing of projects. Secondly, we demonstrated both theoretically (with a 
simplified model) and practically (with a more complex case study) the positive effect of phasing under 
certain conditions (limitedness of sunk-costs due to phasing, predominance of capacity problems). 
In general terms, it is not always possible to plan linear transport infrastructure this way. but we think that 
potential phasing is quite a common situation. There are differences between parallel phasing (like the 
theoretical model analysed here) and serial phasing (like the FARE proposal for the New Turin-Lyon 
Railway, characterised by near-to-zero phasing extra costs). In parallel phasing most of the time and 
operating benefits are usually achieved as the first section is completed, but cost savings from building the 
sections together may be significant. Conversely, serial phasing may provide only a part of the benefits for 
each completed section, but cost savings from building the sections together are usually smaller. However, if 
capacity is the main issue (and not speed upgrade, for example), both cases can well fit this rule. In terms of 
sensitivity analysis, this flexible strategy intrinsically performs better than a rigid one, if costs don’t rise too 
much. 
By numerically developing a simplified and independent CBA of the new Turin – Lyon railway line project, 
we showed that a phasing strategy on the basis of a “switching rule” like the “FARE” proposal can reduce 
the risk of overestimation of traffic and provide positive effect in terms of NPV of the project: if forecasts are 
optimistic, only the most effective parts of the scheme will be built. If the traffic forecasts are correct, the 
new infrastructure will be built as a whole in steps and will generate the highest net benefits. Because of the 
many educated guesses and inputs, we don’t make any consideration on the overall opportunity of this 
megaproject, even if the clearly negative results suggest prudence and need for a deeper public CBA, in 
particular with respect to the recent traffic fall. 
Another possible positive effects of a “switching rule” strategy, may be achieved if the network manager is 
linked to the train operating company – still quite a common in situation in the railway sector: a “switching 
rule” could act as an incentive to increase traffic in order to reach the required traffic and obtain the 
financing of the second section (this seems to be the case of the Lötschberg base tunnel, Schreyer, Sutter e 
Maibach 2009). 
In a more general sense, the switching rule seems to involve some clear incentive to develop “fair” traffic 
forecasts throughout the whole decision process. Ex-post analysis , whose importance has been increasingly 
stressed in recent years in the scientific debate (e.g. EVA TREN, 2008 or Short & Kopp, 2005), this way 
right enters the planning and assessment phase of the whole project itself. This issue can assume a major role 
for megaprojects, whose traffic often may not be treated as an “external” and independent factor, just 
because the complex relationships existing between extending network plans and transportation policies both 
at national and international level. Returning on the Swiss case, it can be argued that the quite good traffic 
performances of Lötschberg base tunnel result not only from exact traffic forecasts, but also from 
comprehensive and coherent policies aiming to enhance demand shift from road to rail (Metz 2004). 
In conclusion, our approach tried to solve a common problem faced by analysts making a CBA under 
uncertain conditions. Even if powerful and theoretically based tools exist to manage such uncertainty, for 
example introducing option values, such approaches require not only the basic data – already difficult to find 
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– but also the variance of such data. In many cases it is simply impossible to obtain such data with a 
sufficiently reliability. For this reason, we think that, in some conditions, introducing in the decision-making 
process some “switching rules” on demand levels might be a good way to manage “on the road” the 
uncertainty of forecasts. Ideally, it is like reducing year by year the variance (the uncertainty) of demand 
forecasts by observing the actual demand and taking decisions on new expansions consequently. The payoff 
is the extra-cost associated to phased projects. It can be estimated ex-ante by engineers and compared with 
the quantifiable flexibility benefits (in some cases, it can even be near-to-zero, in linear capacity expansion 
projects like the Turin – Lyon freight line). The tool to make this comparison can be, as we showed, the CBA 
in the usual form that reveals perfectly adapt to manage such rules in a reasonably simple way.  
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